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Abstract
We present a dynamic two-period model of individual behaviour
with heterogeneous agents in which individuals decide how to allocate
their disposable time between education, crime and work in the legal
sector. Education has a multiple role: it implies higher expected wages
in the legal sector, increasing the opportunity cost of committing crime
and it has a sort of “civilization” eﬀect that makes more costly to
engage in criminal activities. We model this eﬀect by introducing a
peer pressure function.
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11 Introduction
In 2001 more than 75% of the overall convicted population in Italy1 had
not graduated from high school.2 T h e s ed a t aa r eq u i t es t r i k i n g ,e v e ni f
they are not surprising. In fact, as conﬁrmed by several studies criminals
tend to be less educated and from poorer economic backgrounds than non-
criminals [e.g. Wilson and Herrnstein (1985)]. Freeman (1991) asserted that
criminals tend to be less educated and from poorer backgrounds than others
in the U.S. in 1986, over two thirds of all 18-24 year old imprisoned men
and three fourths of the 18-24 year old black prisoners had fewer than 12
years of schooling. Thus, one could expect that areas with higher average
educational levels should have a lower incidence of crime. Similar results
have been obtained by Grogger (1998), who underlies the role of age and
education in criminal activities, and by Lochner (1999), that stated that
“older, more intelligent, and more educated workers tend to commit less of
some property crimes than others”.
Thus, identifying low education as one of the main causes of criminal
activities could be helpful in designing eﬀective and proper policies aimed
at increasing the level of education and schooling in order to reduce crime
rate.
Education may aﬀect the decision to engage in criminal activities in sev-
eral ways. First, higher levels of educational attainment are associated with
higher wage rate, a higher wage rate raises the opportunity cost of criminal
behaviour and may reduce crime participation. Second, education may alter
personal preferences in a way, that aﬀects decisions to engage in crime. In
particular education may have a sort of “civilization” eﬀect and then could
represent a valid policy in preventing crime. Fajnzylber et al. (2002) assert
that “education, through its civic component, may increase the individual’s
moral stance. On the other hand, education may reduce the costs of commit-
ting crimes...because education may open opportunities for an individual
to enter higher-paying crime industries. Hence the net eﬀect of education
on the individual’s decision to commit a crime is, ap r i o r i , ambiguous.”
But “we can conjecture, however, that if legal economic activities are more
skill or education intensive than illegal activities, then it is more likely that
education will induce individuals not to commit crimes” (p. 1328).
Third, school enrolment alone (independently of the level of educational
attainment) reduces the time available for participating in the crime activity
[e.g. Witte and Tauchen (1994)].
Hence, education appears to be an important variable in determining
1At 15 January 2002 the prison in Italy were hosting 55.751 persons. In particular,
0.85% has a university degree, 7.52% has a high school degree, 37.36% has 8 years of
schooling (licenza media), 29.16% has 5 years of schooling (licenza elementare), 8.23% has
no degree, 1.52% is illitterate, 15.36% has not been recorded.
2Data obtained by the Oﬃcial Statistics of Ministero della Giustiza, year 2001
2crime rate both for its direct economic implications and for its “civilization”
eﬀect.
In this paper, we develop a simple two-period model of criminal be-
haviour. In our framework individuals decide how to allocate their dispos-
able time among education, crime3 and work in the legal sector. Education
in our model has a multiple role: i) by investing in education agents raise
their productivity/skills and improve their labour market perspectives thus
incurring a higher opportunity cost of crime; ii) by investing in education
during adolescence, merely by the fact of attending school individuals have
less time to spend in criminal activities and iii) education has a sort of “civ-
ilization” eﬀect that makes more costly to engage in criminal activities [e.g.
Usher (1997) and Fajnzylber et al. (2002)].
We model this “civilization” eﬀect of education by introducing a peer
pressure function, following Kandel and Lazear (1992). In particular, by
using a peer pressure function, our goal is to analyze how individuals are
aﬀected in taking their decisions by peer group components (i.e. parents,
relatives, schoolmates, neighbourhood).
Education has a negative eﬀect on criminal activities and in particular, it
can be as eﬀective as other policies in preventing crime. Our model predicts
that education also has an indirect eﬀe c tt h a ta ﬀects the preferences of
individuals. The “socialization” eﬀect makes criminal decision more costly
in psychological terms, then more educated individuals will commit less
property crimes than others.
Our model has a number of predictions about crime. An increase in
education subsidy or otherwise a reduction in tuition fees will raise time
spent in education by adolescents and this leads to a lower level of crime
during adulthood. In general, a higher education subsidy leads to an equilib-
rium with more education and less crime during adolescence and less crime
during adulthood. In insecure societies, where there is a high probability
of suﬀering a property damage, agents will have less incentives to engage
legal activities. Finally, the model suggests that law enforcement policies
that reduce the expected returns from illegal activities or otherwise increase
the cost of committing crime, lead to an equilibrium characterized by lower
crime and higher employment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
present in details the model and the equilibrium. Section 3 presents the
results and Section 4 concludes.
3We will focus our attention on property crime, as it is more likely to depend on
economic motivations than violent crime (i.e. murder, assault, rape, etc.).
32T h e M o d e l
We consider a two-period model of individual behaviour with heterogeneous
agents in which adolescents and adults4 decide how to allocate their dis-
posable time among education, crime and work in the legal sector. Level
of ability and endowments achieved in primary school are taken as given.
We analyze the impact of education subsidies, taxes, law enforcement (i.e.
probability of apprehension), victimization rate, peer pressure and level of
wages on crime behaviour. Below we describe the various components of
our framework.
2.1 Preferences
The economy is populated by a large number of individuals who are ex-ante
heterogeneous with respect to their learning abilities (εi). Each individual
maximizes the present value of her lifetime utility with respect to the time
allocated to education in the ﬁrst period (si,1)a n dt h et i m ea l l o c a t e dt o







The utility function is deﬁned as
Ui,t = ci,t − γ(si,t−1)(di,t −
_
dt) (2)
where ci,t: consumption of individual i in period t, si,t: time spent study-






: average time spent
committing crime by others belonging to the same peer group, γ(si,t−1)(di,t−
_
dt): peer pressure function, ρ : intertemporal discount factor. The share of




where I is the number of ability types.
The individual’s utility depends on her consumption and on her disutil-
ity, comparable with consumption, coming from her decision about crime.
The peer pressure function can be interpreted as implying that individuals
get disutility from committing more crimes than their peer group compo-
nents. The magnitude of these eﬀect is caught by γ(si,t−1) and depends on
education.
4As we will discuss in the subsection 2.7, we make the hypothesis that adults will only
choose between work in the legal sector and criminal activities. Namely they will not
invest in education.
42.2 Occupational Opportunities
Denoting with wt the wage rate in period t, with li,t t h et i m es p e n tw o r k i n g
in the legal sector and with τ the tax rate, disposable income from legitimate
activities of a type-i individual is given by
yi,t =( 1 − τ)wthi,tli,t (3)
=( 1 − τ)wthi,t [1 − si,t − di,t] (4)
where hi,t represents the level of ability of individual i at time t.
The individual ability is deﬁned as:
hi,t+1 = εisα
i,twith 0 <α<1 (5)
Individual ability is an increasing function of the level of education acquired
in the previous period by agents and of εi, learning ability diﬀerent among
individuals. We assume hi,0, that represents the level of ability acquired
during primary school, is given.
2.3 Criminal Opportunities
During their lives agents optimally choose whether to be engaged or not in
criminal activity. If an agent is engaged in criminal activity, she obtains
with probability (1 − πa) ar e t u r nR(di,t,h i,t), function of the time devoted
to crime activities and individual ability. With probability πa ac r i m i n a li s
apprehended and punished. An apprehended criminal goes to jail for the
entire period in which she is apprehended.5
2.4 Victimization
Each individual faces an equal probability πv of being victim of a crime,
where πv is equal to the endogenous fraction of criminals in the population.6
If victimized, an individual loses a fraction δ of her disposable income from
legitimate activities.
5Our analysis is general and will not change allowing that an apprehended criminal
goes to jail for a fraction of her disposable time.
6By using the Law of Large Numbers we can consider πv to be the same both for
criminals and non criminals.
52.5 Peer Pressure Function
“The peer pressure function is an attempt to formalize the discussion of
taste” [e.g Kandel and Lazear (1992), p. 804]. Starting from the analysis by
Kandel and Lazear in their paper on “Peer Pressure and Partnerships”, we
try to apply this function to the model of crime. Usher (1997) states that
“education promotes good citizenship. Education does more than teach
skills to enhance one’s capacity to earn income. It perpetuates the values of
society, enculturates people to serve their communities, and promotes the
virtues of hard work and honesty” (p. 368). Education aﬀects individuals’
preferences and modiﬁes their perception of phenomena as crime, corruption
and other illegal attitudes. In this sense education may alter individuals’
behaviours and in particular may be particularly helpful in reducing or en-
hancing the inﬂuence of peer group components. In other words, if education
promotes the virtues of hard work and honesty it is likely that an individual
living in a “bad” neighbourhood will be aﬀected in taking her decision and
will act diﬀerently with respect to her peer group components, on the other
hand if an individual lives in a context where honesty is a shared values it
is likely that education may enhance her adherence to the prevalent social
rules.
Individuals are aﬀected in taking their decisions by peer group compo-
nents (i.e. relatives, parents, schoolmates, neighbourhood). In this sense the
role of socioeconomic background is relevant in aﬀecting individuals’ deci-
sions, but we think that the role of education may be important in modifying
some “bad” attitudes coming from peer group.




where γ(si,t−1) is an increasing function of the education level attained
in the previous period and (di,t −
_
dt) is the diﬀerence between individual’s
time spent committing crime and average time spent committing crime by
others belonging to the same peer group. We can identify γ(si,t−1) as a
“socialization” moralization eﬀect of education, while the component (di,t−
_
dt) represents the eﬀect determined by deviating from the average behaviour
of components of respective peer group.7
The eﬀect of the peer pressure function on utility is negative if overall
individual will commit more crime than her peer group average and is pos-
itive if she will commit less crime than her group average. The magnitude
of this eﬀect is given by the ﬁrst component γ(si,t−1). In particular, more
7We consider linear deviation from average behaviour, then if the level of crime chosen
by individual is less than the average level of crime chosen by her peer this leads to an
increase in her utility.
6educated people tend to suﬀer more disutility, while less educated tend to
underestimate these eﬀects.
2.6 Function Properties




























In words, return from crime are increasing at decreasing rate in time
devoted to crime itself and in individual ability; internal pressure (the ﬁrst
component of the peer pressure function) is increasing at decreasing rate in
the level of education.
2.7 Time Endowment
Disposable time is allocated among each activity: school, work in the legal
sector and crime. Individual time endowment is: li,t + si,t + di,t =1and
li,t,s i,t,d i,t ≥ 0. If apprehended, individual will go to jail for the entire
length of the model period. In the second period schooling is equal to 0,
namely individuals can choose only between work in the legal sector and
be engaged in criminal activities. Then in the second period the individual
time endowment is: li,2 + di,2 =1and li,2,d i,2 ≥ 0.
2.8 Honest and Criminal Consumption level
Given the assumptions made in the previous subsection, the consumption
level of an individual who chooses not to be a criminal is given by
ci,t =
½
yi,t − si,tT with probability (1 − πv)
(1 − δ)yi,t − si,tT with probability πv
(7)






yi,t + R(di,t,h i
t) − si,tT with prob (1 − πv)(1 − πa)
(1 − δ)yi,t + R(di,t,h i,t) − si,tT with prob πv(1 − πa)
c with prob πa
(8)
7where T represents the direct cost of education, namely tuition fees paid
by agents minus education subsidy obtained by the government (T = F −S)
and c is the level of consumption of a convicted criminal.8
2.9 Agent’s Decision
G i v e nt h et a xr a t e( τ), the wage rate in the ﬁrst and in the second period
(w1 and w2), the tuition fee (F), the education subsidy (S) and the learning
ability (εi), individuals choose how to allocate their disposable time among








subject to (7), (8) and the time constraint.
2.10 Equilibrium
The problem faced by an individual can be written as:
max

           
           
max
si,1













φw1h1(si,0)(1 − si,1 − di,1)+








πac +( 1− πa)R(d∗






           
           
(10)
where φ =( 1− τ)(1 − πa)(1 − δπv) and θ =( 1− τ)(1 − δπv).
Due to the fact that agents are heterogeneous with respect to their learn-
ing ability, there will be a level of learning ability ˆ ε such that for εi > ˆ ε agents
will be honest and for εi < ˆ ε agents will be engaged in criminal activities.9
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   
φw1h1(si,0)(1 − si,1 − di,1)+πac − si,1T+















   
   
(11)
8As in Imrohoroglu et al. (2000a) we assume that apprehended criminals cannot work
or access their assets to ﬁnance their consumption while they are in jail.
9This is due to the fact that if the return from legal activity, relative to that from illegal
activity, increases increasing ability then agent problem satisfy the reservation property.
This imply that agent will be honest above a certain level of ability and she will engage
in criminal activities below.
8The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to si,1,d i,1and di,2 for an interior
solution are:
di,1 : φw1h1(si,0)=( 1− πa)Rd1(di,1,h i,1) − γ(si,0) (12)











di,2 : φw2h2(si,1)=( 1− πa)Rd(di,2,h i,2) − γ(si,1) (14)
The FOCs allow us to study individual behaviour and in particular how
agents allocate their disposable time among school, work in the legal sector
and crime.
Equations (12) and (14) show that individuals spend time in committing
crime up to the point in which the expected marginal return from crime
equal the expected marginal return from legal activities after taxes plus the
marginal eﬀect of peer pressure. With peer pressure expected return from
illegal activities is lower than it would be without peer pressure. If, as we
have supposed, the internal pressure function is increasing in the level of
education, then individuals more educated will ﬁnd more costly to commit
crimes because they get disutility from the criminal activity.
Equation (13) allows us to study the costs and returns of education. On
the one hand, a higher level of education implies higher returns both from
legal activities and criminal activities. This depends on the fact that edu-
cation aﬀects both ability in the legal sector and in the criminal sector. On
the other hand, an individual with an high level of education if apprehended
and convicted experiences greater losses in earnings.
2.11 Speciﬁc Functional Forms
In order to ﬁnd an explicit solution for the model we suppose that the
functions presented in the previous sections have the following functional
forms displaying the functions’ properties discussed above:
hi,t(si,t−1)=εisα
i,t−1 with 0 <α<1 (15)
γi,t(si,t−1)=s
β





i,t with 0 <η<1 (17)


















i,1 (1 − d∗
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We know that −1 < 1
η−1 < 0 and (1 − πa)η < 0.
In this section we brieﬂyp r e s e n tt h ee ﬀects of policy variables, we will
discuss in details the implications of the model in the following sections. An
increase in education received in t−1, also primary schooling, will lead to a
reduction in the level of crime in the following period. Moreover, an increase
in taxes and an increase in δπv, that determine the incentive to work of
agents,10 will have a positive eﬀect on time devoted to crime. Finally, both
an increase in wages and in the probability of apprehension (πa)h a v ea
negative eﬀect on time spent committing crime.
We are interested in ﬁnding an equation for si,1. By using (19), that
represent the FOC with respect to si,1,w ec a nd e ﬁne:
δεi(1 − πa)
h
(1 − τ)(1 − δπv)w2sα−1

































10δπv determines the incentive to work of agents. In fact, δπv determines the expected
net (post-tax) salary that a worker will spend for consumption considering that she will
be victimized with probability πv and a fraction δ of her salary will be subtracted. If
we consider very insecure society (i.e. with high levels of both the fraction of net salary
stolen (δ) and the probability of being victimized (πv)) the expected net income from
work of a worker is very low and it does not compensate her disutility of going to work.
In other words, if with high probability a big fraction of salary will be stolen an agent will
prefer not to work. Then in very insecure society agents will work less or, even if it is not
considered in our model, will spend part of their income for private security in order to
be safe of eventually attacks.
10rearranging and deﬁning
(1 − τ)(1 − πa)(1 − δπv)=φ
(1 − πa)(1 − η)=µ
we obtain
φw2εisα−1
















that represents an implicit function in si,t. By simulating and calibrat-
ing this equation for diﬀerent values of the parameters we found that the
left hand side of equation (24) is decreasing in si,1.F u r t h e r m o r e , w e c a n
determine the eﬀects of policy parameters on education. In particular, both
an increase in income tax (τ)a n di nδπv leads to a reduction in education,
while a reduction in T, obtained either by an increase in education subsidy
or a reduction in tuition fees paid by agents, will raise time spent in educa-
tion. Moreover, an increase in second period wages will lead to an increase
in education in the ﬁrst period, while an increase in ﬁrst period wages will
reduce time spent in school.11 Finally, the eﬀects of learning ability and
probability of apprehension on time spent in education are ambiguous.
3P r e d i c t i o n s o f t h e M o d e l
In presenting the results and the implications of the model we focus our
attention on interior solutions. This is mainly due to the fact that avail-
able data and several empirical studies stress that between 60% and 80% of
individuals who decide to commit crimes are engaged at the same time in
the legal sector or school [Lochner (1999) and Imrohoroglu et al. (2001)].
Then, it appears more relevant to focus on them, than to study boundary
solutions in which individuals either not commit crimes or spent the whole
amount of their disposable time in criminal activities.
3.1 Crime and Education
As previously asserted in the above paragraphs, education may have a neg-
ative eﬀect12 on criminal activities and in particular, it can be as eﬀective
11In particular, note that increasing the level of the ﬁrst period wage implies that
education is more costly in terms of foregone income. Moreover, ceteris paribus,t h e
increase in adolescence wage will reduce the time spent in criminal activities.
12Anyway, it is possible that there will be a positive correlation between crimes and
education, when the returns to education are higher in the criminal sector than in the
legal sector. In particular, it is the case of white-collar crime. But in general for typical
property crime education negatively aﬀects crime.
11as other policies in preventing crime. From the explicit solution for di,t
[equation (21)], we observe that an increase in the time spent in receiving
education tends to reduce property crime unambiguously. A higher level
of education implies higher expected wages (or returns) in the legal sector,
increasing the opportunity cost of committing crime. Moreover, a compul-
sory attendance reduces available disposable time, then the merely fact of
attending school is a deterrent for crime by reducing available time for crim-
inal activities.13 But our model also predicts that education has an indirect
eﬀect (“socialization eﬀect”) that aﬀects the overall individuals decision of
engaging in criminal activities. The socialization eﬀect makes criminal deci-
sion more costly in psychological terms (internal pressure), while the overall
eﬀect of the peer pressure depends on average peer group behaviour. More
educated individuals will commit less property crimes than others.
3.2 Crime and Wages
From equation (21), we observe that an increase in the wage rate has a
negative eﬀect on crime. In particular, we have to distinguish between
adolescents and adults. In adulthood an increase of wage unambiguously
reduces the time spent in criminal activities, during adolescence we have a
more complex eﬀect. In fact, a higher wage implies that adolescents spend
more time working in the legal sector but they reduce both the time for ed-
ucation and the time spent in committing crime. This results is conﬁrmed
by equation (24). In particular the eﬀect on education of an increase in ado-
lescence wage rate is negative, while an increase of adulthood wage rate will
lead to an increase in time spent for education during adolescence. On the
one hand, a higher wage during adolescence implies that education is costly
in terms of foregone income, then individuals will prefer to allocate more
time to legal work than to education. This will also imply that by choosing
less education during adolescence individuals will have a lower wage in the
second period, then their opportunity cost of being criminal will be lower,
and furthermore γ will be lower.14 On the other hand, a higher wage during
adulthood implies that more skilled workers will beneﬁtf r o mi t ,a n dt h e n
individuals are prone to study more during adolescence in order to exploit
higher wages when adults. Furthermore, higher wages during adolescence
will lead to a higher level of criminal activity in adulthood because of less
education attained and then in the second period individuals will committ
more crimes.
13In this context it is reasonable to expect that increasing the compulsory school age
could have a negatively eﬀect on crime.
14E d u c a t i o ni nt h eﬁrst period has a double eﬀects in adulthood. In fact, it will aﬀect
the level of wage of individual and her peer pressure function. In particular the γ(si,t−1)
component that is a function of the education level attained in the previous period.
123.3 Crime and Victimization
Insecure societies are characterized by a higher level of victimization rate
than others. It is reasonable to expect that in this kind of society the
probability of being victim of a crime will aﬀect individual decision. From
equation (21), we observe that a joint increase in the probability of victim-
ization (πv) and in the fraction of disposable income stolen if victimized (δ)
has a positive eﬀe c to nc r i m e . I nf a c t ,w ec a nc o n s i d e rt h ej o i n te ﬀect of
δπv as the incentive to work for individuals. The more likely they will be
stolen of a fraction δ of their income the less they work. In particular, if
δπv =1individuals will not work at all and they will spent their time by
committing crime. We can also assume, even if we have not considered in
our model, that in very insecure society level of crime is higher, individuals
can also decide to spend a fraction of their income for personal security (e.g.
security camera, private policy force).
3.4 Crime and Probability of Apprehension
From equation (21), we observe that an increase in the probability of ap-
prehension reduces the level of time spent in committing crime. Increasing
the probability of apprehension corresponds to a reduction of the expected
return from illegal activities. This means that prevention and eﬀective law
enforcement policies will allow to reduce the overall crime rates. At the
same time, by reducing the time spent in committing crime, an increase
in πa implies that individuals will spent more of their disposable time in
education or work, when they are adolescent, or in legal work when adults.
Hence, more intensive law enforcement will reduce the expected returns from
illegal activities. The new equilibrium is characterized by lower crime and
higher adult employment. Adolescents will both invest more in education
and spend more time in working in the legal sector. Spending more time in
education when adolescent leads to higher legal returns when adults making
crime decision more costly.
3.5 Crime and Education Subsidies
By simulating equation (24), we observe that an increase in education sub-
sidy or otherwise a reduction in tuition fees will raise time spent in education
by adolescents. On the one hand, this implies that during adolescence in-
dividuals will spend less time committing crime, but we need to distinguish
between working and not working adolescents. In fact, working adolescents
are not aﬀected by education subsidies, because the amount of time spent
committing crime is only determined by their potential wage. Non-working
13adolescents will spend more time in school and reduce their criminal ac-
tivities in response to higher education subsidies. On the other hand, a
higher level of education during adolescence means a lower level of crime
during adulthood, as previously discussed in paragraph 2.3.1. In general, a
higher education subsidy leads to an equilibrium with more education and
less crime during adolescence and less crime during adulthood.
3.6 Crime and Taxes
From equation (21), we observe that a tax reduction reduces crime by im-
plying a higher disposable wage.15 This means that a correct and eﬀective
ﬁscal policy will allow to reduce crime rate. At the same time, by reducing
the time spent in committing crime, a reduction in τ implies that individ-
uals will spend more of their disposable time in education or work, when
they are adolescent, or in legal work when adults. The new equilibrium is
characterized by lower crime and higher adult employment. Adolescents will
both invest more in education and spend more time in working in the legal
sector. Spending more time in educati o nw h e na d o l e s c e n tl e a dt oh i g h e r
legal returns when adults making crime decision more costly. We need to
notice that by reducing taxes government will have less resources to spend
on crime prevention, then this will turn out in a reduction of πa,t h a tw i l l
imply more crime and more insecure society. The overall eﬀect depends on
the strenght of these two diﬀerent eﬀects.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Crime generates a negative externality and produces relevant economic and
social costs. Crime is primarily a problem among uneducated and disad-
vantaged individual as well as from poor and “bad” neighbourhoods. A
higher level of education implies higher expected wages in the legal sector,
increasing the opportunity cost of committing crime. Education also has
an indirect eﬀect (“socialization” eﬀect) that aﬀects the overall decision of
individual of participating in criminal activities. The socialization eﬀect
15In our model a reduction in taxation has a negative eﬀect on crime, because it implies
a higher disposable wage, while as stressed by Chiu and Madden (1998) increase in income
tax progressivity reduces the crime rate. In their model they “show how the level of crime
may be higher under regressive taxation” (p. 136) and “in particular, a poll tax would
induce a higher crime rate than a proportional tax, which would in turn induce a higher
crime rate than a progressive tax” (p. 135). We need to distinguish between relative and
absolute inequality. In our model we simply care about disposable resources of individuals,
but we do not consider relative inequality as in Chiu and Madden, this is why we obtain
an opposite result.
14makes criminal decision more costly in psychological terms (internal pres-
sure), while the overall eﬀect of the peer pressure depends on average peer
group behaviour (social background). Thus more educated individuals will
commit less property crimes than others.
Education is an important determinant of criminal behaviour and iden-
tifying low education as one of the main causes of criminal activities could
be helpful in designing eﬀective and proper policies aimed at increasing the
level of education in order to reduce crime rate. It is interesting to notice
that impatient societies, with a higher intertemporal discount rate, will be
more prone to undertake policies aiming at increasing the probability of ap-
prehension, while more patient societies will prefer to adopt measures that
allow for a persistent reduction of crime in the long run, as by increasing
the education level.
Our analysis suggests that a correct mix of enforcement, education subsi-
dies and taxation policies reduces crime. In particular, increases in enforce-
ment and in education (via education subsidies) are likely to considerably
aﬀect the level of crime and to be important components of an eﬀective
crime-ﬁghting strategy.
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